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 In 2002, the U.S. Coast Guard launched an innovative and highly complex contracting relationship with a Lockheed Martin and 
Northrup Grumman joint venture. The relationship 
was designed to overcome the “rigid regulations and 
red tape that all too often killed contracts through 
a thousand small wounds” (1). By April 2007, after 
a firestorm of negative media, whistleblowing, and 
impending congressional hearings, the Coast Guard 
returned to “buying assets one at a time, scrambling 
to hire more contract managers, and relying on a 
traditional regulatory and enforcement contracting 
approach” (2). The procurement experiment in 
innovation, flexibility, and cost-saving failed after just 
5 years. 
 Through this complex contracting case, Brown, 
Potoski, and Van Slyke aim to bridge the divide 
between academics and practitioners. They draw from 
theory and prior research to help explain the events 
that transpired in the case without overreliance on 
technical terminology. This is more clearly described 
below. Their ultimate objective is to provide insights 
that will improve the purchasing process for both 
buyers and sellers involved in complex products and 
services. They accomplish these objectives and several 
others through a detailed case study analysis with both 
rigor and depth that provides real value to scholars, 
students, and practitioners. 
 The presentation of the case, and subsequent 
analysis, anchors itself to two primary approaches 
for contracting. The rule-based approach requires 
the government buyer to identify  a priori all the 
specifications and terms required, while the vendor 
simply agrees to meet those terms for payment. The 
relationship-based approach allows the buyer and 
seller to engage over the long term to meet evolving 
mutually beneficial expectations. Exact specifications 
and terms are determined over time, together. This 
evolution is enhanced by the relationship between 
the two that encourages a win-win solution over the 
long haul. 
 Both approaches have merit and both are deeply 
flawed. The relationship approach, stemming from 
the New Public Management literature, suggests 
the promise—a way forward that transcends 
bureaucracy—and overlooks short-sighted, zero-sum 
games. This relational approach risks uncertainty and 
potentially divergent stakeholder goals early on, in 
favor of the longer-term understanding gained through 
true partnership. The rule-based approach serves 
the conservative baseline by minimizing risk to both 
parties. It protects and limits, but provides clarity and 
accountability. The authors seek to ultimately combine 
the best of these two approaches to serve the interests of 
both buyer and seller, especially for complex contracts 
where rules are difficult to foresee and relationships will 
be strained after the so-called honeymoon. 
 The authors first present their theoretically grounded 
framework for managing complex contracts 
(Chapter 2). Chapter 2 is a gem in and of itself, as 
it explains, “Our aim in this chapter was to suggest 
a way for buyers and sellers to approach complex 
contracting, diagnose the grounds for both its win-
win and lose-lose potential, and begin to consider 
how to better structure the rules and relationships 
underlying complex exchanges” (54). They then 
introduce us to the Deepwater program (Chapter 3), 
setting the tone and background for their analysis 
of the complexities of the contracting process that is 
focused on rules (Chapter 4), performance incentives 
(Chapter 5), and behaviors (Chapter 6), before 
plotting a path forward in terms of management 
strategies for complex contracts (Chapter 7). 
 The theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2 sets 
the stage for the case, but it also serves as an excellent 
graduate level primer on contracting, ideally suited 
for courses on public management (e.g., for a week on 
contracting). First, the authors differentiate between 
simple and complex products. Next, they present 
the difficulties with contracts designed for complex 
products, such as the Deepwater project. Positioning 
contracts as sets of rules, they differentiate between 
 Reviewed by:  Eric C.  Martin 
 Bucknell University 
 Trevor L.  Brown ,  Matthew  Potoski , and  David M.  Van Slyke ,  Complex 
Contracting: Government Purchasing in the Wake of the US Coast 
Guard’s Deepwater Program  (Cambridge,  2013 ). 268 pp. $43.81 
(hardcover), ISBN: 9781107038622 . 
 
 Eric C. Martin is associate professor 
of management in the Managing for 
Sustainability Program at Bucknell 
University’s College of Management. He 
earned a bachelor’s degree in science from 
the University of Vermont, a master’s degree 
in public administration from Indiana 
University, and a doctoral degree in public 
administration and policy from the State 
University of New York at Albany. Martin’s 
research focuses on inter-organizational 
partnering across the public, private, and 
nonprofit sectors. 
E-mail :  eric.c.martin@bucknell.edu 
Book Reviews 167
product rules and exchange rules. Then, the authors 
discuss the challenges of incomplete contracts, which 
motivate the need for a relational understanding of 
contracts, where they rely on game theory and the 
classic prisoners’ dilemma. By distinguishing between 
rule-based and relationship-based approaches to 
solving complex contracting dilemmas, the authors 
explore Ostrom’s common pool resources, Williamson’s 
social interactions governance, and Axelrod’s tit-for-tat 
strategies, among others in a survey of the governance 
landscape. The problem’s “lock-ins” and uncertainty 
create a rule-based approach that implies the need for 
collective action solutions, fraught with well-illustrated 
relational concerns. The necessary conditions for 
this desired behavior require buyers and sellers to 
be engaged in repeated interactions, information 
symmetry about goals and behaviors, and alignment 
between parties regarding the future and reputational 
effects. Rules rarely encourage such things. 
 After establishing the theoretical framework, Brown, 
Potoski, and Van Slyke (2003) describe the Coast 
Guard’s need to upgrade its fleet of air and sea vessels. 
They begin with an overview of the history of the 
Coast Guard and the myriad activities and functions 
with which it is tasked: defense readiness, migrant 
and drug interdiction, aids to navigation, search and 
rescue, enforcement of fishing laws and marine safety, 
environmental protection and other law enforcement 
activities. For much of their history, the agency was 
spread thin, earning it a reputation for thrift while 
maintaining high performance levels. Eventually, 
however, low-cost “just in time” repairs were not 
sufficient to address underlying structural problems 
with their equipment. 
 The Deepwater program represented a big picture 
solution to the Coast Guard’s decaying fleet and the 
problems inherent in the traditional procurement 
process. Operating under the Clinton White House, 
a central tenet of the Deepwater plan was to bundle 
purchases into single, large contracting arrangements 
to align systems across the Coast Guard’s many 
assets and actions. They reinvented the traditional 
federal piecemeal procurement process, proposing 
instead a lead systems integrator (LSI) to serve as 
general contractor responsible for the “system of 
systems.” This contractor would design the system, 
contract for parts, manage subcontractors, and 
assemble product components. The general contractor 
selected for the job, Integrated Coast Guard Systems 
(ICGS), was a new joint venture of two of the largest 
defense contractors in the industry, who would 
partner with the Coast Guard under Deepwater. 
The rise of public–private partnerships, the wave 
of government reinvention in the 1990s, the New 
Public Management movement, and the National 
Performance Review all supported the Deepwater 
procurement conceptualization to eschew the 
traditional and wasteful procurement process of one-
off purchases, which were in favor of the “system of 
systems” approach of bundling various asset needs into 
one complex “product” with many varied components 
deliverable over a much longer time frame. 
 This new approach promised to lower contract 
management costs, increase efficiencies and economies 
of scale and scope, and focus both buyer and seller on 
systems integration to improve mission achievement. 
Unfortunately, they moved a bit too far and too quickly 
from the safe, rule-based approach to the complex 
relational approach in the midst of many other moving 
parts. They moved from procurement of many simple 
products, employing simple contracts with many sellers, 
to one massive complex product, requiring a similarly 
complex contract, with a single seller relying on the 
promise of a long-term mutually beneficial relationship. 
Measuring success of the program, the contract and the 
relationships proved difficult; they needed rules. 
 The next three chapters represent the heart of this 
study. They vividly illustrate the role that rules, 
performance incentives, and organizational behaviors 
play in complex contracting. The savings envisioned 
by the systems of systems gave way to organizational 
realities, politics, and confusion. The authors detail the 
three-tiered contracting process from the overarching 
Indefinite Quantity Contract, to the agency task orders 
and the integrated project teams, explaining the logic 
and necessity of each. However, the real value of the 
chapter lies in the discussion of intersections between 
the three. As incomplete rule-based contracts gave way 
to the relational approach, competing values, capacity, 
mandates, time horizons, cost understandings, and 
decision parameters quickly reduced the theoretically 
efficient three-tiered rule-based system to a nightmare 
of inter- and intra-organizational ineffectiveness. 
 Performance based incentives proved equally 
problematic. First, planning took much longer 
than expected, delaying implementation. 
Second, performance outputs, measurements, 
and awards were never fully articulated. As the 
authors highlight, “The most measurable ICGS 
outputs from that time were a series of standards 
and measurement procedures for the Deepwater 
performance award system itself!” (157). Awards 
based on ratings of “good” or “marginal” were 
ambiguous. Traditionally, the Coast Guard relied 
on well-understood outcome measurements to 
gauge their success, such as the percentage of lives 
saved in search and rescue, or the percentage of 
migrants interdicted, but determining whether 
improvements in these outcome measures resulted 
from Deepwater was nearly impossible. Aligning 
incentives, performance, and rewards through rules 
proved infeasible across all the varied stakeholders in 
the new system of systems. 
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 Behavioral solutions fared about as well. One Coast 
Guard leader suggested, “I honestly felt, and still think 
today, that the best contracts are tied to the healthiest 
relationships, where the people have the ability to 
be open, honest and trusting” (183). However, in 
practice, healthy relationships can be strained when 
there is asymmetric information and money at stake. 
When asked about performance problems with the 
contract, a respondent described a change that ICGS 
made at the bequest of the Coast Guard to “save a 
nickel.” ICGS made the change, even though they 
knew that the change would ultimately lead to worse 
outcomes. If ICGS had pushed back, how would 
the Coast Guard know that ICGS was “behaving 
consummately” rather than “perfunctorily”? They had 
not yet developed the win-win shared outlook that the 
long-term relational approach promised. They were 
stuck in the zero-sum, rule-based approach, despite the 
appearance of a long-term relationship. The authors 
framed this discussion in terms of three periods, the 
honeymoon, the fog, and the divorce, where at first 
both parties assumed consummate behaviors, until 
doubt set in, and soon skepticism regarding perceived 
perfunctory action. The win-win promise of the 
honeymoon became the prisoners’ dilemma of divorce. 
 In the final chapter of the book, the authors distill the 
lessons learned from the case into three core tenets 
that can guide future contract management. First, 
both parties must understand the uncertainty and 
specialized investment required to deliver and receive 
complex products. Second, rules must be well crafted 
to promote and reinforce cooperation between the 
buyer and seller. Finally, relationships must be built 
and developed focused on the future. Doing so can 
minimize the opportunity for self-interested behavior 
and promote cooperative action. 
 They offer four practical suggestions to accomplish 
this. First, the system of systems concept is not itself 
the problem, so they must be cautious not to throw 
the baby out with the proverbial bathwater. Second, 
the LSI role is also not the problem, she serves a 
valuable role, but employing those first two strategies 
requires constant and iterative producer and user 
input, for which there is no solution other than 
seemingly constant communication. In addition, both 
parties, despite the LSI role, must maintain their own 
internal contract management capacity. Eliminating 
such roles is not the place for cost savings. 
Furthermore, third-party review and monitoring 
(despite the costs associated) can complement that 
internal contract management capacity before, during, 
and after procurement, and should be utilized. 
 Taken together, the strengths of this book are its 
conceptual clarity and ability to distill a complex 
case into relatively easy-to-grasp, practical lessons 
that push back against simplistic notions of 
contracting out to save money or reduce political 
exposure. At the authors’ own admission, this book 
is not a “how to” book. With this caveat in mind, 
the book avoids specific actionable prescriptions 
for success. Given the depths of understanding 
that were clearly demonstrated, one might desire 
answers to some questions raised, but the authors 
stop short of providing specific steps for effective 
complex contracting. What exactly does one need 
to understand about complex product procurement? 
What rules would serve parties best, and when? 
How does one build a relationship that transcends 
mistrust? In addition, while the degree of detail 
and the depth of players’ voices throughout this 
work speak to the thoroughness of the research, the 
book lacks a sophisticated discussion of methods. 
These two additions would have made this required 
reading for doctoral students across many disciplines. 
Regardless, it represents a remarkable effort that 
reads well, applies theoretically sophisticated 
analysis, and tackles a complex and highly relevant 
case study in public management in a readily 
digestible fashion. 
 At the onset of this review, I suggested that the 
authors accomplished their goals of bridging the 
linguistic divide in contracting, illustrating the 
value of academic guidance in contract strategy, and 
improving governmental purchasing processes for 
complex products and services, and more. This book 
also accomplishes the important, though unstated, 
goal of reaffirming the value of single case study 
research. They leave little doubt that they included 
the voice of many key players. The work appears 
iterative, evolving as the authors learned more about 
the case. It is properly theoretical, punctuated with 
vivid, authentic accounts and interpretations by 
those most closely involved. Finally, this research 
demonstrates the importance and value of bridging 
the divide between scholars and practitioners 
to produce research with real implications and 
important insights. 
 Ultimately, this book provides a case study in 
organizational learning—and the inability of our 
government and its contractors to do so at times. 
The authors underscore the desire to do so, and 
the obstacles that limit success. They map a path 
forward, not by prescription, but through a broader 
understanding of stakeholder management and shared 
strategic direction accomplished through contracts 
that display a sufficient understanding of the nature of 
complex products so that rules promote cooperative 
behavior and build strong healthy interorganizational 
relationships—no small task. 
